The Trump administration’s new plan for Ukraine is apparently to reverse all the progress it has made there in recent months. And not just that—to create a much bigger strategic problem that will bedevil the administration for the next three years. The strangest part of all of this is that the plan emerged at a moment when Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy had finally found its footing after a very turbulent start.
Over the past 24 hours, multiple media outlets, citing several administration officials with direct knowledge, have published details of a new U.S. peace proposal that is tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. As drafted, the plan would require Ukraine to give up territory and fortifications in the parts of the Donbas that it still controls, cut the size of its armed forces by half, abandon weaponry that Russia deems to be offensive (including long-range missiles), accept an end to U.S. military assistance, and agree to a ban on foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The Trump administration is dangling a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine in the event of future Russian aggression, but what that would entail is unclear and would almost certainly fall far short of a NATO-style mutual-defense commitment. The plan actually guts the one security guarantee that would make a real difference, namely a strong and capable Ukraine.
Russia has demanded these concessions for years, but the Trump administration, to its credit, has rejected them before now. Earlier this year, President Trump floated a proposal that was tilted toward Moscow—freezing of the front lines, no NATO membership for Ukraine, U.S. recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and a lifting of all sanctions on Russia—but stopped short of demanding that Ukraine give up additional territory or accept a unilateral demilitarization. Those negotiations reached an impasse, and so Trump had a choice. He could continue to support Ukraine, mainly through arms sales and by increasing pressure on Russia. Or he could take Russia’s side and try to impose a Vladimir Putin–backed deal on the Ukrainians.
The president eventually chose the first option. This meant accepting that the war would continue, despite his strong desire to end it; but it also allowed him to begin to create the conditions for a negotiated settlement later in his term.
The news over the past 24 hours has cast all of that into doubt. Some speculate that the latest diplomatic effort is the work of Trump’s special envoy for peace missions, Steve Witkoff. Witkoff appeared to confirm these suspicions on social media, when he replied to a post with what seems to have been intended as a direct message, saying that Axios must have gotten the original story from “K,” possibly a reference to the Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev. On Tuesday night, Secretary of State Marco Rubio seemed to distance himself from the plan with a post on social media that said the United States was developing a list of ideas with input from both sides.
The leaked initiative comes at a moment when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been weakened by a recent corruption scandal, and when General Keith Kellogg, special envoy for Ukraine and one of the administration officials most sympathetic to Kyiv, has let it be known that he will be stepping down from his role in January. Maybe Witkoff saw an opportunity in these circumstances. But Zelensky cannot accept such a punitive deal, no matter how weak he is politically. And even if he did accept it, the Trump administration would be making a world of trouble for itself.
Trump may recall that President Joe Biden’s poll numbers never recovered from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. He can expect something similar with Ukraine. If his administration ends all arms sales and intelligence cooperation with Kyiv, it will be held responsible for the slow and painful Ukrainian defeat that will surely follow. Moscow will probably then press its advantage by stamping out every ember of sovereignty inside Ukraine, on the excuse that this is all a part of implementing the peace plan’s provisions. Russia may also act against European states that continue to help Ukraine. China and North Korea will be emboldened by their ally’s victory. And the Trump administration will find that its problem has metastasized.
All of this is completely unnecessary. After much back-and-forth, before today, Trump had landed on a Ukraine policy that was consistent with his views, workable, and sustainable. The United States was no longer spending money on Ukraine. Ukraine and the Europeans were close to putting together a $90 billion arms purchase, much of which would be produced in the United States and be a boon to the American defense industry. A strong Ukraine that could defend itself would not have to rely on the United States for a security guarantee. The United States could continue arm sales while insisting on a peace settlement that allows for an independent and sovereign Ukraine—and Trump might have had a deal to end the war later in 2026 or in 2027.
Instead, Witkoff may have convinced himself that he could reproduce the deal that ended the war in Gaza. The circumstances there were fundamentally different. Israel had defeated Hamas and Iran on the battlefield. Hamas effectively acknowledged that. The United States helped to codify that reality into a deal. But Russia has not defeated Ukraine. It is also not an ally of the United States. This latest plan trades a policy that was making slow but real progress for one that threatens to become a strategic defeat. Assuming the plan is Witkoff’s, the question now is whether it was a solo effort, leaked by the Russians to damage Ukraine—or if he has the support from the president and the rest of the administration to get his way.